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GONZALES V. RAICH: HOW TO FIX A MESS OF
“ECONOMIC” PROPORTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1937 to 1994, the Supreme Court upheld every single
application of Congress’s power that was challenged under the
Commerce Clause.1 Then in 1995, for the first time in over fifty years
the Court invalidated an act under the Commerce Clause, the Gun-Free
School Zones Act,2 in United States v. Lopez.3 The Court followed up
Lopez in 2000 by striking down part of the Violence Against Women
Act4 in United States v. Morrison.5 Suddenly, the Commerce Clause
was alive and well, or was it?6
In 2005, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Gonzales v. Raich.7
Would the Supreme Court hold true to their recent trend of placing
meaningful limits on the commerce power, or would the Court revert to
their “toothless” judicial review and continue to reject as-applied
challenges under the Commerce Clause?8
A thorough analysis of Raich demonstrates that the Lopez and
1. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally, Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume
Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1996) (referring to post-New Deal Commerce Clause
as the “Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause”).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990).
3. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
5. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See infra notes 66-82 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
6. See Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does
the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 736 (2003) (stating without more guidance from
the Court, the real effect of Lopez and Morrison will be minor and have few practical effects). See
also, Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253 (2003); Glenn H.
Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the Supreme Court
Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369.
7. 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005).
8. See Jonathon H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751 (Winter 2005) (arguing Raich continued the Supreme Court’s practice
of rejecting as-applied challenges under the Commerce Clause); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical
Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 880
(2005) [hereinafter Pushaw, Counter-Revolution] (calling judicial review under the Commerce
Clause “toothless”).

545

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 5
WATTS FINAL.DOC2

546

4/23/2007 9:26:13 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:545

Morrison standard is an “economic” mess with no basis in the
Constitution.9 The Constitution does place meaningful restrictions on
congressional legislation of “commerce.”10 First, the legislation must
concern “commerce.”11 Second, that “commerce” must be “among the
several States.”12 This Note argues that the text of the Commerce Clause
can be adequately defined to place meaningful limits on Congress and
provide easy rules for judicial review,13 and proposes that the Court
adopt a Neo-Gibbons approach because the existing approach is
inadequate.14
The Note examines the history, evolution, elements, and application
of the Commerce Clause doctrine.15 Part II, Sections A through C,
concentrate on the history of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, focusing extensively on Wickard v. Filburn,16 which
the majority in Raich held controlling, and United States v. Lopez17 and
United States v. Morrison,18 which the dissent would have held as
controlling.19 Part II, Sections D and E, provide an overview of the
Controlled Substances Act,20 whose constitutionality was challenged as
applied in Gonzales v. Raich,21 and the Compassionate Use Act22 of
California, which led to the conflict in Raich.23 Part III provides a
statement of the facts, the procedural history, and the United States
Supreme Court decision in Gonzales v. Raich.24 Part IV, Sections A and
B, analyze the Raich decision, arguing that based on fundamental legal
arguments the Lopez/Morrison standard applied in Raich is inadequate.25
In Part IV, Sections C through E, the meanings of the words
9. See infra notes 121-39 and accompanying text (discussing this point). See also Christy H.
Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce By Another Name: The Impact of United States v. Lopez and
United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 605 (Spring 2001) (arguing the standards in
Lopez and Morrison “will prove to be unworkable”).
10. See U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. See infra notes 141-65 and accompanying text (analyzing the term “commerce”).
12. See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text (analyzing the phrase “among the several
States”).
13. See infra notes 191-223 and accompanying test (discussing the Neo-Gibbons approach).
14. Id.
15. See infra Parts II-V.
16. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
17. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
19. See infra notes 29-82 and accompanying text.
20. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
21. 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005).
22. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11362.5 (2005).
23. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 90-112 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 113-40 and accompanying text.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss3/5

2

Watts: Gonzales v. Raich: An "Economic" Mess
WATTS FINAL.DOC2

2007]

4/23/2007 9:26:13 AM

GONZALES V. RAICH: AN “ECONOMIC” MESS

547

“commerce,” “among the several States,” and “to regulate” are analyzed
based on the text and history of the Constitution.26 Part IV, Section F,
proposes a Neo-Gibbons standard,27 and Section G applies this standard
to Commerce Clause jurisprudence.28
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Commerce Clause
Among the enumerated powers delegated to Congress in the
Constitution is the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. . . .”29 Despite
initially defining the commerce power broadly in Gibbons v. Ogden,30
the Supreme Court’s early cases interpreted the Commerce Clause too
strictly.31 Later, however, expansive interpretations practically granted
Congress plenary power under the Commerce Clause to pass extensive
federal regulation.32 Federal regulations have extended to areas
traditionally considered the province of state governments, such as
criminal statutes.33 For over fifty years, the Supreme Court found no
federal regulation unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress had
exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause.34 Then, in 1995, the
Supreme Court declined to expand further the commerce power and
thereby placed a limit on Congress’s authority to make laws under the
Commerce Clause.35

26. See infra notes 141-91 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 191-223 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 224-44 and accompanying text.
29. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). See infra notes 37, 147-48, 169 and accompanying
text (setting out the Gibbons Court’s analysis).
31. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
33. See Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (concerning the Controlled Substances Act,
making it a federal crime to possess marijuana and other controlled substances); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (involving the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, making possession
of a gun near a school zone a federal crime); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding
loan sharking as a federal crime).
34. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
35. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding as unconstitutional a federal
civil remedy for victims of gender motivated violence under the Violence Against Women Act);
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (striking down an attempt by Congress to criminalize possession of a gun in a
school zone under the Gun-Free School Zones Act ).
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B. The Commerce Clause Pre-1995
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall examined whether
commercial navigation was “commerce,” and whether that commerce
had taken place “among the several states.”36 After finding both
conditions met, Chief Justice Marshall articulated the commerce power
in Gibbons as an expansive power to regulate commerce “among the
several states” that “is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution.”37 Despite Chief Justice Marshall’s broader interpretation
of “commerce” in Gibbons, prior to 1937 the Supreme Court routinely
struck down legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause that it
considered local in nature, and stressed that the activities (e.g.,
manufacturing, labor) were not “commerce.”38 The Court allowed
regulations only where the goods involved passed interstate.39
36. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (holding that New York could not grant an exclusive
right to operate steamboats in New York waters where the federal government also granted licenses
under federal law). See infra notes 148, 169 (setting forth Chief Justice Marshall’s articulation of
“commerce” and “among the several states”).
37. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196 (1824) (holding that New York could not grant an exclusive right
to operate steamboats in New York waters where the federal government also granted licenses
under federal law). Professor Pushaw states that Chief Justice Marshall was “not saying that
Congress has plenary power under the Commerce Clause,” but rather “if a subject is ‘commercial’
and concerns more than one state, then Congress can regulate the subject however it pleases.” EMail from Robert Pushaw, James Wilson Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law,
to author (Dec. 3, 2006) (on file with author). The Commerce Clause and the Constitution do
prescribe some limitations. See infra notes 141-90 and accompanying text (discussing these
limitations).
38. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (pronouncing that Congress had
no power to regulate the maximum hours and minimum wages in coal mines because the labor
provisions fall upon production, not commerce, and production is a local activity); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (finding the Congress had no power to regulate
the hours and wages of a local poultry slaughterhouse); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co.,
295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating a law establishing a compulsory retirement and pension plan for
all carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act because it was a regulation related solely to the
social welfare of the worker and not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the
Constitution); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a congressional act of
1916 that excluded the products of child labor from interstate commerce because manufacturing was
considered local activity), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States
v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that manufacture of goods was not interstate
commerce and that the regulation of a monopoly in sugar refining was outside the scope of the
commerce power using a direct/indirect approach).
39. See, e.g., Houston E. & W. Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S.
342 (1914) (upholding congressional authority to reach intrastate railroad rates that discriminated
against interstate railroad traffic under a “substantial economic effects” approach); Hoke &
Economides v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the Mann Act which prohibited the
transportation of women across state lines for prostitution); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U.S. 45 (1911) (pronouncing that articles which are “outlaws of commerce” may be seized); Swift
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The Court took a dramatic turn after President Franklin Roosevelt
embarked on his New Deal with America.40 The commerce power went
virtually unchecked from 1937 until 1995.41 The most expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause came in Wickard v. Filburn.42

& Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (validating a Sherman Act injunction against price
fixing by meat dealers under the “stream of commerce” theory); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery
Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding the Federal Lottery Act of 1895 which prohibited importing,
mailing, or interstate transporting of lottery tickets on the grounds that articles of traffic, such as
lottery tickets, were articles of commerce).
40. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 216 (1995). While President Roosevelt threatened a courtpacking plan to save the New Deal legislation from judicial invalidation by loading the Court with
justices willing to find his policies constitutional, the then-existing Court abandoned the restrictive
interpretations in the Commerce Clause in favor of an almost plenary power interpretation. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 187 (1997). Compare
JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 135, 140 (1937) (suggesting that Justice
Roberts’s “switch in time” from the narrow interpretation to the broader liberal view occurred
before the President’s court-packing plan was announced), with MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME
COURT CRISIS (1937) (arguing that the court-packing plan intimidated Justice Roberts into
switching his voting trend from conservative to liberal). See generally Michael Ariens, A ThriceTold Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 630-31 (1994).
41. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(upholding the National Labor Relations Act, which regulated hours, wages, and working conditions
in businesses over a certain size, effectively overruling Schechter Poultry). The Court stated that, “It
is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the criterion” for determining
Commerce Clause constitutionality. Id. at 32. The Supreme Court reinforced the “effect upon
commerce” approach in United States v. Darby. 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding regulation of
wages and hours in the manufacture of goods intended for shipment in interstate commerce,
overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart). In “perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over interstate activity,” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995), the Wickard v.
Filburn Court upheld as constitutional the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which limited the
amount of wheat that a farmer could produce. 317 U.S. 111, 115 (1942). Filburn was found liable
under the Act even though the excess wheat was for home consumption because the interstate price
was a function of the total wheat production and “homegrown wheat . . . competes with wheat in
commerce.” Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125, 127-29. See also, Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding federal pollution laws because surface coal
mining affects interstate commerce); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act that extended coverage to every employee employed
in an enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce) overruled by Nat’l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)
(validating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to local restaurants on the grounds that
discrimination in restaurants affected interstate travel and that much of the food had traveled in
interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a local hotel because segregation would discourage travel,
affecting interstate commerce).
42. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress could regulate wheat cultivated for home
consumption because, when viewed in the aggregate, leaving home-consumed wheat outside the
regulatory scheme would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions).
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1. Wickard v. Filburn43
In 1941, Filburn sought a declaratory judgment stating that the
wheat marketing quota provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
193844 as applicable to him were not sustainable under the Commerce
Clause.45 Filburn had exceeded his allotment for the 1941 wheat crop.46
He harvested additional bushels of wheat for home consumption, which
under the Act were marketing excess and subject to penalty.47 Filburn
argued that although Congress had the ability to regulate production of
goods for commerce, its power did not authorize regulation of
production not intended for commerce but wholly for consumption on
the farm.48
43. Id.
44. 7 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. The general scheme of the Act as related to wheat was to “control
the volume moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and
the consequent abnormally low or high wheat prices and obstructions to commerce.” Wickard, 317
U.S. at 115. Under the Act, the Secretary of Agriculture annually announced a national acreage
allotment for the next crop of wheat, which was apportioned to the states and their counties, and
eventually into allotments for individual farmers. Id. Small producers were exempt from the quotas.
Id. at 130.
45. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-14. Filburn had for many years owned and operated a small
farm in Montgomery County, Ohio. Id. at 114. It was his practice to raise a small acreage of wheat;
“to sell a portion of the crop; to feed part to poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is
sold; to use some for making flour for home consumption; and to keep the rest for the following
seeding.” Id. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 “extend[ed] federal regulation to production
not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.” Id. at 118. The
marketing quotas included that which may be sold without penalty and what may be consumed on
the premises. Id. at 119.
Wheat produced on excess acreage is designated as ‘available for marketing’ as so
defined and the penalty is imposed thereon. Penalties do not depend upon whether any
part of the wheat either within or without the quota is sold or intended to be sold. The
sum of this is that the Federal Government fixes a quota including all that the farmer
may harvest for sale or for his own farm needs, and declares that wheat produced on
excess acreage may neither be disposed of nor used except upon payment of the penalty
or except it is stored as required by the Act or delivered to the Secretary of Agriculture.
Id. (internal footnote omitted). Filburn sowed 23 acres, however, and harvested from his additional
11.9 acres 239 excess bushels of wheat, which under the Act were marketing excess and subject to
penalty. Id. at 114-15.
46. Id. at 114. Filburn’s allotment for the 1941 wheat crop was 11.1 acres with a normal yield
of 20.1 bushels of wheat an acre. Id.
47. Id. at 115. Filburn could have avoided the penalty by turning over the excess wheat to the
Secretary of Agriculture or storing it under regulation of the Secretary. Id. However, Filburn argued
he intended to use the excess wheat by consuming it on his farm. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17
(2005).
48. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (sustaining the
federal power to regulate production of goods for commerce). In Darby, the court stated:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of
commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss3/5

6

Watts: Gonzales v. Raich: An "Economic" Mess
WATTS FINAL.DOC2

2007]

4/23/2007 9:26:13 AM

GONZALES V. RAICH: AN “ECONOMIC” MESS

551

A unanimous Court rejected Filburn’s argument.49 The Court found
“[t]he effect of consumption of homegrown wheat on interstate
commerce [was] due to the fact it constitute[d] the most variable factor
in the disappearance of the wheat crop.”50 Congress may properly
consider “that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly
outside the scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect in
defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at
increased prices” and, therefore, the Commerce Clause applied.51
C. Major Precedent Since 1995
1. United States v. Lopez52
The Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 (GFSZA) made it a federal
offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm . . . at a place
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise
of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Id. at 118. See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that
intrastate activities that “have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions” are
within Congress’s power to regulate under the Commerce Clause).
49. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. “[E]ven if [Filburn]’s activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it still may, whatever it nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. . . .” Id.
50. Id. at 127. Consumption appears to have accounted for greater than twenty percent of the
average production. Id. The Court stated:
The effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be produced for
market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by
producing to meet his own needs. That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, is far from trivial.
Id. at 127-28.
51. Id. at 129. “The wheat industry [had] been a problem industry for some years.” Id. at 125.
The Wickard court stated the following:
One of the primary purposes of the Act in question was to increase the market price of
wheat and to that end to limit the volume thereof that could affect the market. It can
hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat
would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions. This may arise
because being in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the market and if induced
by rising prices tends to flow into the market and check price increases. But if we
assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would
otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. Homegrown wheat in this sense
competes with wheat in commerce.
Id. at 128.
52. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, which made it
a crime for an individual to possess a gun in a school zone, was invalid).
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that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone.”53 Respondent, a twelfth-grade student, carried a concealed
handgun into his high school and was charged with violating the
GFSZA.54 The district court found the student guilty of violating the
Act.55 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction,
finding the statute invalid because it was beyond Congress’s power
under the Commerce Clause.56 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.57
The United States Supreme Court found that the GFSZA exceeded
the authority of Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States. . . .”58 The Court identified three broad categories of
activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power: (1) the
“use of the channels of interstate commerce[;]” (2) the “instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities[;]” and
(3) “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”59
The Court analyzed the GFSZA under the third category, regulation
of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.60 The Court
found that Section 922(q) was a criminal statute that had nothing to do
with commerce or economic enterprise, that it contained no
jurisdictional element to ensure the firearm possession in question
affected interstate commerce, and that neither the statute nor its
legislative history contained express congressional findings on the affect
53. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1990).
54. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted the
student, who admitted he was carrying a .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Id. He was arrested
under state charges that were subsequently dropped the very next day when federal agents charged
him with violating the law Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. Id. The student moved to dismiss
his federal indictment on the ground § 922(q) was unconstitutional as beyond the power of Congress
under the commerce clause. Id. The district court denied the motion. Id.
55. Id. at 552. The student had waived his right to a jury trial and was sentenced to six months
of imprisonment and two years’ supervised release. Id.
56. Id.
57. United States v. Lopez, 511 U.S. 1029 (1994) (granting a petition for a writ of certiorari).
58. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
59. Id. at 558-59 (internal citations omitted).
60. Id. at 559. The Court quickly disposed of the first two categories noting § 922(q) “is not a
regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the
interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce” and that § 922(q)
cannot “be justified as a regulation by which Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of
interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce.” Id. Under the third category, the proper test
is whether the regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce. Id. “Where economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained.” Id.
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of gun possession in a school zone on interstate commerce.61 Therefore,
“[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially
affect any sort of interstate commerce.”62
Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented.63 The
dissent first stated that the specific question before the Court was “not
whether the ‘regulated activity sufficiently affected commerce,’” but
“whether Congress could have had ‘a rational basis’ for so
concluding.”64 In the dissent’s view, Congress could have rationally
concluded that gun-related violence near schools had an adverse impact
on interstate commerce when violence, education, and economic facts

61. Id. at 561-62. In addition, the Lopez Court stated:
Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Id. at 561. Unlike the statute in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (making it a crime for a
felon to receive, possess, or transport in commerce or affecting commerce any firearm), Section
922(q) had “no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm
possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62. The Court noted that while Congress is not required to make
particularized findings, such findings “would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial
effect was visible to the naked eye. . . .” Id. at 563.
62. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that “possession
of a firearm in a school zone may result in violent crime and that violent crime can be expected to
affect the functioning of the national economy in two ways.” Id. at 563. First, the costs of violent
crime are substantial and through insurance are dispersed throughout the population. Id. at 564.
Second, violent crime reduces travel to areas perceived to be unsafe. Id. The Government also
argued that there is a substantial threat to the educational process through threats to the learning
environment which would result in an impaired educational process producing less productive
citizens adversely affecting the Nation’s economic well-being. Id. Under the Government’s “cost of
crime” reasoning, Congress could regulate all violent crime and activities that could lead to such. Id.
Similarly, under the “national productivity” reasoning, Congress could regulate could regulate any
activity it found to be related to productivity including family law. Id. It is difficult to find any
limitation on federal power under the Government’s theories. Id. “[I]f Congress can, pursuant to its
Commerce Clause power, regulate activities that adversely affect the learning environment, then, a
fortiori, it also can regulate the educational process directly.” Id. at 565. “To uphold the
Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States.” Id. at 567. To do so would eliminate the distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local. Id. at 567-68.
63. Id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 617. Courts should give a degree of deference to Congress in determining whether a
significant factual connection exists between the regulated activity and interstate commerce because
the Constitution delegates the power directly to Congress and the empirical judgment is more likely
to be made with accuracy by the legislative body. Id. at 616-17.
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are taken together.65
2. United States v. Morrison66
Morrison involved a female student who had accused two football
players of rape.67 She filed a complaint under the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), which created a private right of action in federal
court for female victims of violence against their assailant.68 The district
65. Id. at 623-24. Numerous reports and studies were available to show that the problem of
guns in and around schools was widespread, serious, and interfered with the quality of education. Id.
at 619-20. Education has long been linked with the Nation’s economy. Id. at 620. Technological
changes have “altered the nature of the workplace so that more jobs now demand greater
educational skills.” Id. “Increasing global competition also has made primary and secondary
education economically more important.” Id. at 621. Today, many firms base their location
decisions on the presence of a work force with a basic education. Id. at 622. The Court continued:
The evidence of (1) the extent of the gun-related violence problem, (2) the extent of the
resulting negative effect on classroom learning, and (3) the extent of the consequent
negative commercial effects, when taken together, indicate a threat to trade and
commerce that is ‘substantial.’ At the very least, Congress could rationally have
concluded that the links are ‘substantial.’
Id. at 623 (internal citations omitted).
[This holding] would permit Congress ‘to act in terms of [economic] realities,’ would
interpret the commerce power as ‘an affirmative power commensurate with the national
needs,’ and would acknowledge that the ‘commerce clause does not operate so as to
render the nation powerless to defend itself against economic forces that Congress
decrees inimical or destructive of the national economy.’
Id. at 625 (quoting N. American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946) (citing Swift v. Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (Holmes, J.)). The majority’s holding creates three legal problems:
modern Supreme Court cases have upheld congressional actions with a less significant effect than
that of school violence; the Court ignores earlier warnings and places a critical distinction between
“commercial” and noncommercial “transactions” instead of looking to the actual effects of the
activity on interstate commerce; and it creates legal uncertainty. Id. at 625-31. Further, Congress
could conclude that schools were commercial. Id. at 629. “In 1990, the year Congress enacted the
statute before us, primary and secondary schools spent $230 billion . . . which accounts for a
significant portion of our $5.5 trillion gross domestic product for that year.” Id.
66. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with
the authority to enact the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)).
67. Id. at 602. Christy Brzonkala was a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia
Tech) in 1994, when she alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford assaulted and
repeatedly raped her. Id. Brzonkala filed a complaint under Virginia Tech’s Sexual Assault Policy
and Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and suspended for two semesters. Id. at 603. Due to
an error in processing her complaint a second hearing was necessary at which Morrison was again
found guilty, but this time his offense was changed from “sexual assault” to “using abusive
language.” Id. Later, Morrison’s punishment was set aside as excessive and Brzonkala withdrew
from the university. Id. at 603-04.
68. Id. at 604. See Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 573, 573 (2004) (stating Morrison “arose from a civil suit under the [VAWA] . . . “).
The VAWA act states that “[a] person . . . who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender . . . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss3/5

10

Watts: Gonzales v. Raich: An "Economic" Mess
WATTS FINAL.DOC2

2007]

4/23/2007 9:26:13 AM

GONZALES V. RAICH: AN “ECONOMIC” MESS

555

court dismissed the complaint, holding that Congress lacked the
authority to enact that section of the statute under the Commerce
Clause.69 An en banc panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion.70 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.71
The Supreme Court first categorized the VAWA under the
“substantially affects interstate commerce” category of Lopez.72 In this
category, the Court articulated four factors for review relevant to a
Commerce Clause analysis.73 First, a court must consider whether the
regulation involves “economic activity;”74 second, whether the
regulation in question contained an express jurisdictional element to
connect it with interstate commerce;75 third, whether the legislative
history contains express congressional findings regarding the effect on
appropriate.” Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2003). Brzonkala filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia and the United States
intervened to defend § 13981’s constitutionality. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604.
69. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604. Another issue in the case was whether Congress lacked
authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that question is beyond the scope of this Note
and will not be addressed. See generally id.
70. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
71. United States v. Morrison, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
72. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09. The Court emphasized that even under the expansive
modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’s regulatory authority is not unlimited. Id.
at 608. The Court stated:
Even our modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional power under the
Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits. In Jones & Laughlin
Steel, the Court warned that the scope of the interstate commerce power ‘must be
considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as
to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace
them, in view of our complex society, would effectively obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.’
Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S 549, 556-57 (1995) (quoting Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937))).
73. Id. at 609-13 (summarizing the framework developed in Lopez).
74. Id. at 610. The Court reasoned that “a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic,
criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision. . . .” Id. The Court stated,
“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.” Id. at
613. See also Bradley, supra note 68 (stating very few cases have been reversed based on Morrison
and Lopez); Choper, supra note 6, at 732 (noting that a number of legal scholars questioned whether
Lopez was an aberration rather than a major shift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence); Richard W.
Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 5 (November, 2003) (arguing that the Court’s recent federalism revival may ultimately be
“much ado about nothing”); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 685, 693 (1996) (stating “Lopez has deprived Congress of very little power”).
75. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12. “Such a jurisdictional element may establish that the
enactment is in pursuance of Congress’[s] regulation of interstate commerce.” Id. at 612. The Court
noted § 13981 contained no jurisdictional element. Id. at 613.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 5
WATTS FINAL.DOC2

556

4/23/2007 9:26:13 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:545

interstate commerce;76 and fourth, whether the link between the
regulated activity and the effect on commerce was “attenuated.”77 After
considering the four factors, the Court held that the VAWA was
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.78
Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.79 The
dissent stated that the business of the Court was merely to review
whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the activity, in
the aggregate, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.80 Under
this approach, the large amount of data Congress assembled provided a
rational basis for the legislation that could not “seriously be
questioned.”81 Moreover, the dissent questioned the validity of an
economic/noneconomic distinction.82
76. Id. at 612. The Court stated that the legislative history was relevant to aid the Court in
evaluating the effect on interstate commerce, when that effect was not apparent. Id. Congress,
however, is not required to make formal findings and such findings alone are insufficient to sustain
the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation. Id. at 612, 614. The Court noted that § 13981
was supported by numerous congressional findings considering the serious impact of gendermotivated violence. Id. at 614.
77. Id. at 612. The United States argued that:
[T]he possession of guns may lead to violent crime, and that violent crime ‘can be
expected to affect the functioning of the national economy in two ways. First, the costs
of violent crime are substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are
spread throughout the population. Second, violent crime reduces the willingness of
individuals to travel to areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe.’ The
Government also argued that the presence of guns at schools poses a threat to the
educational process, which in turn threatens to produce a less efficient and productive
workforce, which will negatively affect national productivity and thus interstate
commerce.
Id. at 612 (internal citations omitted). The Court rejected these “costs of crime” and “national
productivity” arguments because they would allow Congress to regulate any activity that it found
caused crime or related to the productivity of individuals, including family law. Id. at 612-13.
78. Id. at 627. The Supreme Court has “always rejected readings of the Commerce Clause . . .
that would permit Congress to exercise a police power.” Id. at 618-19 (citing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-85 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
79. Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also id. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter summarized the evidence
before Congress. Id. at 628-34.
82. Id. at 644-47; id. at 656-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “[I]f substantial effects on commerce
are proper subjects of concern under the Commerce Clause, what difference should it make whether
the causes of those effects are themselves commercial?” Id. at 644 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter questioned why the formalistic economic/noneconomic distinction should matter
today, noting that the majority believed it was useful in serving a conception of federalism, but
“history seems to be recycling, for the theory of traditional state concern as grounding a limiting
principle has been rejected previously, and more than once.” Id. at 644-45. “[P]olitics, not judicial
review, should mediate between state and national interests[.]” Id. at 647. “The
‘economic/noneconomic’ distinction is not easy to apply.” Id. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The
line becomes even harder to draw because the Court permits Congress to aggregate ‘noneconomic’
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D. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA)83
Congress enacted the CSA as part of the Comprehensive Drug

activity taking place at economic establishments (see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964)), and where the regulation is “‘an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the interstate activity
were regulated.’” Id. at 656-57 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). Regarding the integrated national
economy, Justice Breyer stated:
We live in a Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, technological,
commercial, and environmental change. Those changes, taken together, mean that
virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect commerce, or
its conditions, outside the state—at least when considered in the aggregate. And that fact
makes it close to impossible for courts to develop meaningful subject-matter categories
that would exclude some kinds of local activities from ordinary Commerce Clause
“aggregation” rules without, at the same time, depriving Congress of the power to
regulate activities that have a genuine and important effect upon interstate commerce.
Id. at 660 (internal citations omitted).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. The CSA “repealed most of the earlier antidrug laws in favor of a
comprehensive regime to combat the international and interstate traffic in illicit drugs. The main
objectives of the CSA were to conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate
traffic in controlled substances.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005). Under § 801 of the CSA,
Congress made the following findings related to interstate commerce:
(1) Many of the drugs included within this subchapter have a useful and legitimate
medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the
American people.
(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and improper use
of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and
general welfare of the American people.
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate and
foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate
of foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession, nonetheless
have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce because –
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in interstate
commerce,
(B) controlled substances distributed locally usually have been transported in interstate
commerce immediately before their distribution, and
(C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow through interstate commerce
immediately prior to such possession.
(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling the
interstate traffic in such substances.
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be
differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus,
it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances
manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and
distributed intrastate.
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is
essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.
21 U.S.C. § 801(1)-(6).
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Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.84 Except as provided in the
statute, the CSA makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally
“manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance. . . .”85
Simple possession of a controlled substance is also unlawful, except as
permitted under the CSA.86
E. California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996
In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215, codified as the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996.87 The Proposition was intended to
ensure seriously-ill residents of the State access to marijuana for medical
purposes.88 The Act exempted physicians, patients, and primary
84. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1236 (1970). The act consists of three titles. Raich, 545 U.S. at 12 n.19. Title I addresses the
treatment and prevention of narcotic addicts. 84 Stat. 1238. Title II concerns drug control and
enforcement. 84 Stat. 1242. Title III relates to the import and export of controlled substances. 84
Stat. 1285. Under Title II, the CSA established five “schedules” of drugs and other substances and
designates these items “controlled substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). Marijuana is classified as a
Schedule I controlled substance. Id. § 812(c). For an item to be designated a Schedule I controlled
substance, it must be found (1) that the substance “has a high potential for abuse[;]” (2) that the
substance “has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States[;]” and (3) that
there is “a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.”
Id. § 812(b)(1). The CSA contains procedures by which the schedule of a controlled substance may
be modified. Id. § 811(a).
85. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
86. Id. § 844(a).
87. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11362.5 (2005). California was just one of eleven
States that authorized the use of marijuana for medical purposes. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.090,
17.37.010-17.37.080 (2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3412.01 (2005); COLO. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 14, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 18-18-406.3 (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329121 to 329-128 (LexisNexis 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383B(5) (2004); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-46-101 to 50-46-210 (2005); NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 38, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
453A.010-453A.810 (LexisNexis 2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.300-475.346 (2003); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18 §§ 4472-4474d (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.51A.005-69.51A.080 (2005).
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11362.5(b)(1) (2005). The statute listed as its
purpose:
The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that the purposes of the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 are as follows:
(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana
for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been
recommended by a physician who has determined that the person’s health would benefit
from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain,
spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana
provides relief.
(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana
for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to criminal
prosecution or sanction.
(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for
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caregivers who possessed or cultivated marijuana for medical purposes
with the recommendation or approval of a physician from criminal
prosecution.89
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
California citizens Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson used
marijuana as a medical treatment for a multiplicity of serious physical
conditions.90 Both claimed that their marijuana was cultivated locally
the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of
marijuana.
Id.
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11362.5(c)-(d). “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no physician in this state shall be punished, or denied any right or privilege, for
having recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.” § 11362.5(c).
Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the
cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient’s primary caregiver,
who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient
upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.
§ 11362.5(d). A “primary caregiver” is an individual designated by the patient who has
“consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or safety” of the patient. § 11362.5(e).
California has enacted additional legislation supplementing the Compassionate Use Act. See §§
11362.7-11362.9 (2005).
90. See Joint Appendix at 65-86, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454)
(Declaration of Angel McClary Raich). Raich had been diagnosed with serious medical conditions
including “an inoperable Brain Tumor, life-threatening wasting syndrome with severe weight loss
borderline cachexia, a Seizure Disorder, Nausea, several Severe Chronic Pain Disorders, including
Scoliosis, Temporomandibular Joint Dysfunction Syndrome, Bruxism, Endometriosis, a Tumor in
[her] Uterus, and other documented medical conditions.” Id. at 61-62. Raich began using medical
marijuana in early 1998. Id. at 87. She used “over two and one-half ounces of processed medical
cannabis per week, or over eight pounds of cannabis per year. Id. at 90. Raich maintained that she
would “starve to death without cannabis.” Id. at 61. See also Joint Appendix at 47-51, Raich (No.
03-1454) (Declaration of Frank Henry Lucido, M.D.). Dr. Lucido is Raich’s primary care physician
and is of the opinion that “Angel cannot be without cannabis as medicine because of the precipitous
medical deterioration that would quickly develop.” Id. at 47-48. Cannabis has worked well for
Raich. Id. at 49. She has “no reasonable legal alternative” to medical marijuana because alternative
treatments have proven ineffective or result in intolerable side effects. Id. Raich previously tried the
following medications: Marinol, Demulen Tablets, Codine, Tylenol #3, Erythromycin,
Acetaminophen with Codeine, Serzone, Amitriptyline, Clonidine, Meclizine, Promethazine,
Depakote, Prazosin, Carbamazepine, Imipramine, Trazodone, Methadone, Hydrocodone,
Dicloxacillin, Chlorpheniramine/Phenylpropanolamine, Beclonmethasone, Vicodin, Dilantin,
Tagretol, Desipramine, Valproic Acid, Seldane, Lorazepam, Paxil, Lamotrigine (Lamical), Elavil,
Soma, Albuterol Solution, Fentanyl, and Versed. Id. at 49-50. See also Joint Appendix at 55-59,
Raich (No. 03-1454) (Declaration of Diane Monson). Monson has used medical marijuana since
March of 1999, “on the recommendation of [her] physicians for the treatment of [her] Severe
Chronic Back Pain and Spasms[.]” Id. at 55. See also J.A. at 53, Raich (No. 03-1454) (Declaration
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within California’s borders.91 Drug Enforcement Agents seized and
destroyed Monson’s six marijuana plants on August 15, 2002.92
B. Procedural History
1. The District Court
Raich, Monson, John Doe Number One, and John Doe Number
Two93 sued the Attorney General of the United States and the
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief prohibiting the federal government’s enforcement of
the Controlled Substances Act against them to the extent that it
prevented them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing marijuana
for their personal medical use.94 California’s Compassionate Use Act of
1996 permitted the use and cultivation of marijuana for personal medical
of Dr. John Rose) (stating that medical marijuana is appropriate and provides necessary relief for
Monson’s conditions).
91. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F.Supp.2d 918 (N.D.Cal. 2003), rev’d, Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d
1222 (9th Cir. 2003). Monson grew her own cannabis, while Raich had two caregivers that
cultivated her marijuana for her without charge, because she was unable to grow it herself. Id. at
920. Plaintiffs claimed Raich’s marijuana was “cultivated using only water and nutrients originating
from within California, and that it [was] grown exclusively with equipment, supplies, and materials
manufactured within the borders of the state.” Id. at 921. Monson’s marijuana was “similarly local
in nature.” Id.
92. Id. at 921. Sheriff’s deputies from the Butte County Sheriff’s Department and Drug
Enforcement Agents came to Monson’s home on August 15, 2002. Id. The deputies concluded that
Monson’s use of marijuana “was legally permissible under California’s Compassionate Use Act.”
Id. A three-hour standoff ensued during which the local District Attorney with the United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of California attempted unsuccessfully to intervene. Id. DEA
agents subsequently seized and destroyed the plants. Id.
93. Id. at 920. The two John Doe plaintiffs are Raich’s caregivers who “cultivate several
varieties [of marijuana] and provide them to her without charge.” Id.
94. Id. On October 9, 2002, plaintiffs (hereinafter Raich) filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California seeking declaratory relief and a permanent
injunction. Id. at 921. A motion for preliminary injunction was filed on October 30, 2002, and a
hearing on that motion was held on December 17, 2002. Id. United States district courts may issue
preliminary injunctions. FED. R. CIV. P. 65. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1218 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining ‘preliminary injunction’ as “[a] temporary injunction issued before or during trial to
prevent an irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a chance to decide the case.”).
Raich also sought a declaration that the CSA was “unconstitutional to the extent it purports to
prevent them from possessing, obtaining, manufacturing, or providing cannabis for medical use.”
Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1226 (2003). Raich’s constitutional argument was that the CSA,
when applied to purely intrastate, non-commercial use of medical marijuana, was an impermissible
extension of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce; infringed the rights reserved to the
States through the Tenth Amendment; and violated fundamental rights of citizens protected by the
Ninth Amendment. Raich, 248 F.Supp.2d at 922. Raich also presented a medical necessity defense.
Id.
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purposes upon the recommendation of a doctor.95 The court denied the
motion for preliminary injunction.96
2. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The Ninth Circuit granted Raich’s interlocutory appeal.97 The court
first found that “none of the cases in which the Ninth Circuit has upheld
the CSA on Commerce Clause grounds involved the use, possession, or
cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes.”98 The court then found

95. Raich, 248 F.Supp.2d at 920.
96. Id. at 918. There are two tests the court can apply to determine whether a preliminary
injunction should issue. Id. at 921. “To meet the ‘traditional’ test, the movant must establish: (1) a
strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that the balance of irreparable harm favors its case;
and (3) that the public interest favors granting the injunction.” Id. at 921. “To prevail under the
‘alternate’ test, the movant must demonstrate either a combination of probable success on the merits
and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and that the balance of
hardships tips sharply in its favor.” Id. Under either test, the moving party “must show a fair chance
of success on the merits.” Id. at 922. The court found that despite the gravity of the Raich’s needs
and the concrete interest of California, the existing Ninth Circuit precedent held that the CSA
passed constitutional muster and precluded a finding of likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at
926. The court relied on United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a
challenge to the CSA by a defendant whose marijuana plants were rooted in the soil); United States
v. Rodriquez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1972) (refusing to excise individual drug activity
under the CSA from an entire class of permissibly regulated activity); and United States v. Tisor, 96
F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing the CSA form the Gun-Free School Zones Act found
unconstitutional in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), because of the presence of
congressional findings to support the CSA). Id. at 924. The court further held that the CSA is not a
violation of the Tenth Amendment or the Ninth Amendment, and that there is no medical necessity
defense for violations of the CSA. Id. at 931.
97. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1226. An interlocutory appeal is “[a]n appeal that occurs before the
trial court’s final ruling on the entire case.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 832 (8th ed. 2004). Under
28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(1), the federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from
interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States refusing injunctions. 28 U.S.C.A. §
1292(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 109-467 (excluding P.L. 109-415, 109-417, 109-432, 109435, 109-461, 109-462) approved Dec. 22, 2006). Raich filed a timely appeal on March 12, 2003.
Raich, 352 F.3d at 1226. “A district court’s order regarding preliminary injunctive relief is subject
to limited review.” Id. The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, while the legal issues underlying the district court’s decision are reviewed de
novo. Id. at 1226-27.
98. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227. The court found the appellant’s class—the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the
advice of a physician—was a “separate and distinct class of activities” different in kind from earlier
cases which concerned drug trafficking. Id. at 1228. This class is distinct because the concern
regarding health and safety and policy concerns about the spread of drug abuse are significantly
different when recommended by a physician. Id. Further, “this limited use is clearly distinct from
the broader illicit drug market—as well as any broader commercial market for medical marijuana—
insofar as the medical marijuana at issue in this case is not intended for, nor does it enter, the stream
of commerce.” Id.
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that recent Supreme Court cases, Lopez99 and Morrison,100 have aided in
refining the Commerce Clause analysis.101 Based on the four factors
from Morrison, the court concluded that the CSA, as applied to Raich, is
likely unconstitutional.102 Thus, in a split decision the court reversed the
99. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding the Gun-Free School Zones Act an unconstitutional exercise
of power under the Commerce Clause and setting forth three categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under the Commerce Clause). See supra note 59 and accompanying text (setting out
these categories).
100. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (finding the Violence Against Women Act was an invalid exercise of
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and establishing a four-factor test for determining
whether a regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce). See supra note 73-77 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the four factors.
101. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229.
102. Id. at 1229-34. The court applied the Morrison factors. Id. at 1229. First, the court found
that “[a]s applied to the limited class of activities presented by this case, the CSA does not regulate
commerce or any sort of economic enterprise.” Id. “The cultivation, possession, and use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes and not for exchange or distribution is not properly characterized
as commercial or economic activity.” Id. Non-economic activity is not subject to the “aggregation
principle” of Wickard v. Filburn, which held that the cumulative effect of the activities has a
commercial effect. Id. at 1230. However, these sorts of drug activities were reasonably determined
by Congress to be part of the overall class of activities covered by the CSA that involve economic
activity and substantially affect commerce. Petitioner’s Brief at 36, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005) (No. 03-1454). The growing, processing, and resulting possession of marijuana for personal
use involves economic activity, the production of a fungible commodity for which there is an
established market, in the same way that growing wheat for consumption did in Wickard. Id. at 2122. Wickard established that Congress may regulate local activity if it is an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity and the regulatory scheme would be undercut unless it were
regulated. Id. at 10. But see Respondent’s Brief at 14-18, Raich (No. 03-1454) (discussing how
Wickard differs in at least three respects: (1) unlike the CSA, the AAA exempted small farming
operations and therefore, “did not apply to every person who produced a fungible commodity for
which there is an established market;” (2) Wickard involved a commercial farming operation; (3)
the Court in Wickard required proof of the actual effect of the regulated activity on interstate
commerce). If Petitioner’s definition of “economic activity were accepted, no area of human activity
would fall outside this realm. Id. at 26. Second, the court found that “[n]o such jurisdictional hook
exists in relevant portions of the CSA. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1231. But see Petitioner’s Brief at 17,
Raich (No. 03-1454) (stating the CSA “comprehensively bans all manufacture, distribution, and
possession of any scheduled drug unless explicitly authorized by the Act” in order to establish a
closed system and making all transactions outside the system illegal). Third, the court found the
congressional finding regarding the effects of the regulated activity upon interstate commerce
insufficient. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1232-33. The findings are concerned with trafficking or distribution
of controlled substances, are not specific to marijuana, and the marijuana in this case “never entered
into and was never intended for interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. at 1233. But see Petitioner’s
Brief at 39-40, Raich (No. 03-1454) (discussing that Congress clearly had marijuana in mind when
it made the findings due to marijuana’s placement in schedule I and Congress’s awareness that
marijuana was one of the most widely abused drugs in the country). Fourth, the court found that any
connection between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was
“attenuated.” Raich, 352 F.3d at 1233. But see Petitioner’s Brief at 14-15, Raich (No. 03-1454)
(stating that “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence”). The
court found a strong showing of the likelihood of success on the merits. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234.
The court also found that the hardship and public interest factors tipped largely in Raich’s favor. Id.
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judgment of the district court.103
C. United States Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
In 2004, the Supreme Court granted United States Attorney General
John Ashcroft’s petition for a writ of certiorari.104 The Court undertook
the issue of whether Congress’s power to regulate interstate markets for
medical substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are
supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally.105 The Court held
that the CSA’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession
of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of
medical marijuana pursuant to California state law did not exceed
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.106 The Court found
The court declined to reach Raich’s other arguments based on the principles of federalism embodied
in the Tenth Amendment, the alleged fundamental rights under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments,
and the doctrine of medical necessity. Id. at 1227.
103. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235. The case was remanded to the district court for entry of the
preliminary injunction. Id. On May 14, 2004, the district court entered a preliminary injunction
enjoining petitioners. Petitioner’s Brief at 9, Raich (No. 03-1454). Judge Beam dissented stating it
was “impossible to distinguish the relevant conduct surrounding the cultivation and use of the
marijuana crop at issue in this case from the cultivation and use of the wheat crop that affected
interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn.” Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235 (Beam. J., dissenting).
104. Ashcroft v. Raich, 124 S.Ct. 2909 (2004) (granting a petition for writ of certiorari).
105. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 8 (2005). The Court decided whether the CSA as applied
to the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of marijuana for personal medical
purposes as recommended by a patient’s physician pursuant to California state law was an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power. Id.
106. Raich, 545 U.S. 1. The Court stated that it “need not determine whether respondents’
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a
‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” Id. at 26 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557
(1995)). The Court noted that the similarities between this case and Wickard were “striking.” Id. at
17. In Wickard, the Court concluded that “Congress had a rational basis for believing that, when
viewed in the aggregate, leaving home-consumed wheat outside the regulatory scheme would have
a substantial influence on price and market conditions.” Id. at 19. The activities regulated by the
CSA are quintessentially economic, unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison. Id. at 25. The
“[f]indings in the introductory sections of the CSA explain why Congress deemed it appropriate to
encompass local activities within the scope of the CSA.” Id. at 20. Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that failure to regulate home-consumed marijuana would affect interstate price and
market conditions and “leave a gaping hole in the CSA.” Id. at 22. When “‘a general regulatory
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances
arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” Id. at 17 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; quoting
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196, n.27 (1968)).
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. Id. at 32-41 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia opined that activities that merely substantially affect interstate commerce are not part of
interstate commerce, and thus cannot be regulated by the commerce clause in isolation. Id. at 32-35.
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that the CSA regulated economic activity and therefore Wickard, and not
Lopez or Morrison, was controlling.107 The United States Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals.108
2. The Dissent
Justice O’Connor’s dissent, joined by the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist, opined that the Court announced a rule that gives Congress
an incentive to legislate broadly under the Commerce Clause.109 The
dissent opined that medical and nonmedical uses of drugs are distinct
and can be segregated and regulated differently.110 She found the activity
at question to be noneconomic, and therefore, that the rule and the result
in the present case were irreconcilable with the prior Supreme Court
decisions in Lopez and Morrison.111 Justice Thomas’s dissent argued that
The power derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 34. Under Justice Scalia’s view,
Congress can regulate even intrastate activities that do not substantially affect interstate commerce
if it is necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective. Id. at 39.
107. See Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (majority opinion). The Court defined economics as “the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.” Id. at 25 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). Because the Court held that the CSA regulates “the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities[,]” it was found to be “quintessentially
economic.” Id. at 25. Justice Scalia stated that economic activity that substantially affects intrastate
commerce will be upheld, but that noneconomic activity may only be regulated if its connection to
interstate commerce is not too attenuated. Id. at 34-37 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia opined
that Congress had prohibited intrastate activities related to Schedule I substances under the CSA
that were both economic (manufacture, distribution, possession with the intent to distribute) and
noneconomic (simple possession). Id. at 39. Justice Scalia held, “[t]hat simple possession is a
noneconomic activity is immaterial to whether it can be prohibited as a necessary part of a larger
regulation.” Id.
108. Id. at 32 (majority opinion). Raich also raised a substantive due process claim and a
medical necessity defense. Id. These theories of relief were set forth in the complaint but were not
reached by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not reach these
issues. Id. The Court did, however, note procedures for reclassification of Schedule I drugs as
another avenue of relief. Id.
109. Id. at 44-47 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The majority’s decision “suggests that the federal
regulation of local activity is immune to Commerce Clause challenge because Congress chose to act
with an ambiguous, all-encompassing statute, rather than piecemeal.” Id. at 42.
110. Id. at 48.
111. Id. at 42. Lopez and Morrison are materially indistinguishable from the present case when
the same factors are taken into account. Id. at 44. Those factors in Lopez are: (1) substantial effects
cases “generally have upheld federal regulation of economic activity that affected interstate
commerce[;]” (2) the statute contains “no express jurisdictional requirement establishing its
connection to interstate commerce[;]” (3) “the absence of legislative findings about the regulated
conduct’s impact on interstate commerce[;]” and (4) whether the argument that the conduct could
affect the national economy was to “attenuated.” Id. at 42-45. The same four factors were used in
Morrison. Id. at 44. Justice O’Connor questioned whether “intrastate cultivation and possession of
marijuana for one’s own medicinal use can properly be characterized as economic . . . .” Id. at 48.
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the local cultivation and consumption of marijuana in this case was not
commerce among the several states and was not necessary and proper
for executing Congress’s restriction of interstate drug trafficking.112
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court’s Current Commerce Power Test After Raich
As it now stands, the current test employed by the Supreme Court
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence consists of deciding which of the
three Lopez categories is at issue: (1) instrumentalities; (2) channels; or
(3) substantially affects.113 If the regulation falls into either of the first
She stated that the Court’s definition of economic activity is “breathtaking” and “threatens to sweep
all of productive human activity into federal regulatory reach.” Id. Economic activity is usually
directly related to commercial activity and the homegrown cultivation, possession, and use of
medical marijuana has “no apparent commercial character.” Id. at 49. Lopez held that possession
was not itself economic activity. Id.
112. Id. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The “local cultivation and consumption of marijuana is
not ‘Commerce . . . among the several States.’” Id. Justice Thomas observed that “the term
‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”
Id. at 58 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)). Justice
Thomas stated that, at the time of the ratification debates, the term “commerce” was “consistently
used to mean trade or exchange—not all economic or gainful activity that has some attenuated
connection to trade or exchange.” Id. The majority defines economic activity in the broadest of
terms. Id. at 69. Justice Thomas then cited a dictionary, which defined the term “economic” more
narrowly. Id. at n.7 (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
583 (3d ed. 1992)). However, Justice Thomas pointed out that Congress is authorized to regulate
“commerce,” not “economic” activity, and the local cultivation and consumption of marijuana does
not qualify under any definition of the term “commerce.” Id. at 69. “If Congress can regulate this
under the Commerce Clause, then it can regulate virtually anything—and the Federal Government is
no longer one of limited and enumerated powers.” Id. at 56. Under the traditional definition of
“commerce,” the CSA exceeds Congress’s commerce power as applied to Respondent’s conduct,
which is “purely intrastate and noncommercial.” Id. at 58. “Congress’[s] goal of curtailing the
interstate drug trade would not plainly be thwarted if it could not apply the CSA to patients like
Monson and Raich.” Id. at 63 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that no one argues that
other drugs presenting a high risk for abuse but that do have an accepted medical purpose and are
available under medical prescriptions undermines the CSA’s restrictions. Id. Justice Thomas argued
that even if necessary, the ban on locally cultivated marijuana was not proper because Congress had
“encroached on States’ traditional police powers to define criminal law and to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens.” Id. at 65.
113. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). But see Pushaw, Counter
Revolution, supra note 8, at 906 (stating that “[o]nly seven Justices have endorsed [the ‘substantial
effects’ test] fully, and they cannot agree on its meaning”). See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 589
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting “if a ‘substantial effects’ test can be appended to the Commerce
Clause, why not to every other power of the Federal Government? There is no reason for singling
out the Commerce Clause for special treatment. Accordingly, Congress could regulate all matters
that ‘substantially affect’ the Army and Navy, bankruptcies, tax collection, expenditures, and so
on”). But cf. Substantial Effects Test – Controlled Substances Act, 119 HARV. L. REV. 169

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 5
WATTS FINAL.DOC2

566

4/23/2007 9:26:13 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:545

two categories, instrumentalities or channels, it is upheld.114 However, if
the regulation falls into the third category, the court looks to see whether
the statute regulates economic or noneconomic activity.115 If the
regulation is of economic activity, the Court applies a rational basis
standard and defers to the judgment of Congress.116 If the activity is
noneconomic then the Court will look to legislative findings;117
jurisdictional elements;118 whether the connection to interstate commerce
is too attenuated;119 or whether the regulation is part of a larger
economic regulation that would be undercut if the activity at issue were
exempt.120
B. An “Economic” Mess
There are three major problems with the economic/noneconomic
(November, 2005) (suggesting the Court missed the opportunity to reorient the “substantial effects”
test around the Necessary and Proper Clause).
114. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. It is no longer open to question that Congress can regulate the
channels of interstate commerce. Id.
115. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (stating the activities regulated by the CSA are “quintessentially
economic”); id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that the manufacture, distribution, and
possession with intent to distribute are economic, but that simple possession is not); id. at 48
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the intrastate cultivation and possession of
marijuana for one’s own medical use can be characterized as economic); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (stating “[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained” and “[g]ender-motivated crimes of
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (stating the
criminal statute had nothing to do with “commerce” or “any sort of economic enterprise”). But see
Raich, 545 U.S. at 69 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting the economic distinction in favor of the
text of the Constitution which specifies “commerce”).
116. Raich, 545 U.S. at 20. “We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’
exists for so concluding.” Id.
117. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (stating that the VAWA was supported by numerous
findings regarding the impact of gender-motivated crime); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (finding neither
the GFSZA nor its legislative history contained findings regarding the effect of gun possession in a
school zone on interstate commerce).
118. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (finding the VAWA contained no jurisdictional element
limiting its reach); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (stating the GFSZA contained no jurisdictional element
to ensure the effect on interstate commerce).
119. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (stating that the findings are rejected as unworkable
because they would completely obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (opining that to uphold the government’s cost of crimes and national
productivity reasoning we would have to “pile inference upon inference” turning the Commerce
Clause into a “general police power” of the kind “retained by the States”).
120. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (noting that Wickard establishes that “Congress can regulate . . .
activity that is not ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to
regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that
commodity”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
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distinction.121 The first problem is how one defines “economic” for
purposes of the Commerce Clause.122 Second, depending on whether the
Court aggregates or disaggregates the relevant class of activities for
purposes of defining whether the activity is economic, will affect that
outcome.123 Third, the Constitution grants power over commerce, not
economic activity.124
Not even the justices agree what “economic” means or how the
standard should be applied.125 The Raich majority126 defined “economic”
121. See infra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 128, 132 and accompanying text.
124. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 69 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Professors Nelson and Pushaw state:
[W]e do not equate “commerce” with modern “economics,” which covers virtually all
human endeavors and interactions, including areas such as crime and religion. Although
all conduct has economic consequences, it does not thereby become “commercial” in
nature. Similarly, we recognize that economists would find artificial our effort to
distinguish production and services for the marketplace from similar activities
undertaken for personal or home use. Rather, they would treat all such actions as an
integrated whole because of the effect of home-oriented economic activities on market
supply, demand, and price. Again, defining “commerce” to include all economic impacts
would enable Congress to regulate everything, and thereby drain the Commerce Clause
of any meaningful content.
Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Appling First
Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social
Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 109-10 (1999) [hereinafter Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce
Clause]. See also Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101 (2001) [hereinafter Barnett, Original Meaning] (agreeing with Justice Thomas’s original
meaning of commerce); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear
Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 842 (2005) (asking why talk about economic
activity when the Constitution says commerce, and surmising that the talk was to allow the Court to
validate past cases while permitting it to strike down newer innovations); Pushaw, CounterRevolution, supra note 8, at 895 (stating that the justices mistakenly used the terms “commerce” and
“economics” interchangeably despite the fact the former is a subset of the latter, and that Court did
not define “economic” or “commercial” activity in Lopez or Morrison); Alex Kreit, Article: Why is
Congress Still Regulating Noncommercial Activity?, 28 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169 (2004)
(proposing an approach to the broader scheme doctrine based on the enterprise concept).
125. Compare infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (defining the activity as economic),
with infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text (finding the activity noneconomic in whole or in
part).
126. The Raich majority included Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, all of whom
coincidentally, were Lopez and Morrison dissenters who argued against the economic/noneconomic
distinction. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-66 (2000) (dissenting opinions of Justices
Souter and Breyer); Lopez, 519 U.S. at 602-64 (dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer). Interestingly, Justice Kennedy who concurred in Lopez and joined the majority opinion in
Morrison joined with the four dissenters to provide the fifth vote for the majority opinion in Raich
without opinion. See Adler, supra note 8, at 768-70 (noting that Justice Kennedy’s silence in Raich
was “quite conspicuous”). Some authors have gone so far as to suggest that Justice Kennedy may
have views about drugs that trump his concern about the federal state balance. Posting of Lyle
Denniston to SCOTUSblog, Commentary: Justice Kennedy and the “War on Drugs,”
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broadly as “production, distribution, and consumption[,]” sweeping a
great deal of activity under the deferential rational basis standard.127
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer analyzed the
CSA broadly as applied to “production, distribution, and possession,”
and found it to be “quintessentially economic.”128 This being so, the
Justices held that Congress could have rationally found that locally
cultivated and consumed marijuana had a substantial effect on the
interstate market.129
Justice O’Connor, however, joined by the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist, found that the local cultivation and consumption of medical
marijuana was noneconomic in nature.130 These Justices applied the
CSA narrowly to the specific conduct at issue, “the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation and possession of [marijuana] for personal
medical purposes as recommended by a patient’s physician pursuant to
valid California state law,”131 and would find the CSA unconstitutional
as applied to the Respondent’s conduct.132
Justice Scalia concurred with the Court’s judgment, finding that
some of the activity was economic,133 and that some was
noneconomic.134 Justice Scalia found the distinction between economic
http://scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/06/commentary_just.html (June 6, 2005).
127. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720
(1966)). But see id. at 69 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority did not explain why
it selected a “remarkably expansive 40-year-old definition”). See also supra note 126 (suggesting
the possible reason that the majority in Raich chose such an expansive definition was because it
would severely limit the holdings in Morrison and Lopez, and advance the rational basis test as the
major means of analyzing Commerce Clause challenges); Adler, supra note 8, at 753 (opining that
while Raich purports to be following Lopez and Morrison, it actual represents a repudiation of those
cases).
128. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25. The substantial effects test depends on subjective judgments
concerning the “level of generality at which the regulated activity is characterized[,]” and whether
the effects must be show affirmatively or hypothetically. Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 8,
at 904-05.
129. Raich, 545 U.S. at 20.
130. Id. at 48-49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that “homegrown cultivation and personal
possession and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes has no apparent commercial character” and
that “Lopez makes clear that possession is not itself commercial activity”).
131. Id. at 8 (majority opinion).
132. Id. at 48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Conner noted the problem of the majority’s
shift in focus from the activity at issue in Raich to the entirety of what the CSA regulates. Id. (citing
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995)). But see Ann Althouse, Why Not Heighten the
Scrutiny of Congressional Power When the States Undertake Policy Experiments?, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 779 (2005) (finding Justice O’Connor’s suggested doctrine would be unworkable
and unstable).
133. Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia listed as economic activities
manufacture, distribution, and possession with the intent to distribute. Id.
134. Id. Justice Scalia listed simple possession as noneconomic activity. Id.
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and noneconomic activity to be immaterial to whether Congress could
regulate the activity as a necessary part of a larger regulation.135 Justice
Thomas’s dissent, also found the reliance on the economic/noneconomic
distinction to be misplaced.136
In total, five Justices have rejected the economic/noneconomic
distinction outright.137 These Justices and numerous scholars are correct
in that the economic/noneconomic distinction has no place in Commerce
Clause analysis.138 It is unreliable and is not based on the Constitution.139
The correct analysis under the Commerce Clause, as Justice Thomas
points out, is whether the regulation involves “commerce.”140
C. What is “Commerce?”
There is great scholarly debate on the original meaning of
“commerce” in the Commerce Clause.141 Professor Barnett’s142 research
135. Id. Justice Scalia opined that whether any activity is economic is not relevant to whether
the activity can be prohibited as a necessary part of a larger regulation. Id.
136. Id. at 69 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas advanced the idea of returning to the
original meaning of the Commerce Clause, which requires interpreting the word “commerce” and
not the term “economic.” Id. However, Justice Thomas differs from Justice Scalia in that he does
not find the CSA necessary or proper as applied to Respondent’s conduct. Id. at 70.
137. See infra notes 63-65, 79-82, 112 and accompanying text (concerning the four dissenting
Justices from Lopez and Morrison, and Justice Thomas’s view that the proper focus ought to be on
the meaning of words actually in the Constitution).
138. See infra notes 140-65 (supporting this position).
139. See Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (noting the general disagreement between the opinions over how to
determine whether the activity is economic or noneconomic). See also supra notes 121-36. But cf.
Paul Tzur, Comment: I Know Economic Activity When I See Economic Activity: An Operational
Overhaul of the Measure by Which Federal Criminal Conduct is Deemed “Economic,” 94 CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1105 (2004) (suggesting a “limited economic activity” interpretation).
140. Raich, 545 U.S. at 69. “[T]he very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the
Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’[s] powers and with
this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000)
(Thomas, J., concurring). “I believe that we must further reconsider our ‘substantial effects’ test
with an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause
without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting
Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743 (2005) (suggesting that Raich could be limited to its facts due
to the unique circumstances of the war on drugs and the fungible nature of the commodity, and that
because the Court primarily relied on the larger regulatory scheme, the definition of economic might
be dicta or declined as dispositive by future Courts).
141. Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124 (arguing for a narrow definition of
“commerce” which was limited to the trade and exchange of goods and transportation for this
purpose); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55
ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003) [hereinafter Barnett, New Evidence] (same); Douglas W. Kmiec, Gonzales
v. Raich: Wickard v. Filburn Displaced, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 71 (arguing for the original
meaning of the Commerce Clause); Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause Standard for the New
Millennium: “Yes” to Broad Congressional Control over Commercial Transactions; “No” to
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on the original meaning of the Commerce Clause suggests that
“commerce,” around the time the Constitution was drafted, referred to
buying, selling, bartering, and transportation for these purposes.143
However, Professors Nelson’s and Pushaw’s research supports the
theory that commerce had a broader meaning which included all
activities intended for the market.144 Professors Barnett, Nelson, and
Pushaw are all in agreement, however, that both meanings did exist; they
just disagree on which meaning attached to the word “commerce” for
purposes of the Commerce Clause.145 On the meaning of commerce,
Chief Justice Marshall146 stated in Gibbons v. Ogden:147
Federal Legislation on Social and Cultural Issues, 55 ARK L. REV. 1213 (2003) [hereinafter
Nelson, New Millennium] (arguing for a broader definition of commerce that includes the sale of
good or services and all accompanying activities geared toward the market but does not include
noncommercial regulation); Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124
(same); Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 8 (same); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson,
A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 695 (2002)
[hereinafter Pushaw & Nelson, Critique] (same).
142. Professor Barnett argued for the Respondents before the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Notably, Professor Barnett was cited in the dissent. Raich, 545 U.S. at 58
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 112-25).
143. Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 101. In United States v. Lopez, Justice
Thomas cited: Samuel Johnson, 1 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (W. Strahan 4th
ed. 1773) (defining commerce as “intercour[s]e; exchange of one thing for another; interchange of
any thing; trade; traffick”); Nathan Bailey, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(Neill 26th ed. 1789) (“trade or traffic”); T. Sheridan, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 585-86 (W. Young, Mills and Son 6th ed. 1796) (“Exchange of one thing for another;
trade; traffick”). Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also found
support in the etymology of the word “commerce” which means “with merchandise.” Id. at 586
(citing 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989) (com—“with;” merci—“merchandise”).
Professor Barnett analyzed the text of the Constitution, contemporary dictionaries, notes from the
Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers, and ratification conventions in deducing his
narrow definition of “commerce.” Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 112-25.
144. Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124. Placing the phrase
“to regulate” before “commerce” signified the word should be given its broader meaning—“to enact
rules to govern all gainful activities, including subjects as diverse as trade, navigation, agriculture,
manufacturing, industry, mining, fisheries, building, employment, wages, prices, banking,
insurance, accounting, bankruptcy, business associations, securities, and bills of exchange.” Id. at
17. “[I]n the context of governmental regulations, however, ‘commerce’ included only those human
activities geared toward the marketplace.” Id. at 19. Nelson & Pushaw relied heavily on historical
evidence collected in the works of WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953) and WALTER HAMILTON & DOUGLAS ADAIR, THE
POWER TO GOVERN (1937).
145. Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 131 (stating “I am not disputing here that
‘commerce’ had a broad as well as a narrow meaning”). Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the
Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 17 (stating “[t]o be sure, ‘commerce’ sometimes conveyed a
narrower sense, referring solely to the buying and selling of goods”).
146. John Marshall served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from
1801 to 1835. For more information on Chief Justice John Marshall and the Commerce Clause see
FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE (1937).
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The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution
being . . . one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the
extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the
word. [Ogden] would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the
interchange of commodities, and do[es] not admit that it comprehends
navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many
objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly is traffic,
but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.148

The fact that using either meaning of “commerce” was a valid
interpretation when the Commerce Clause was written is important to
this analysis.149 Even if the narrow interpretation was originally intended
by the framers, it would prove unworkable today.150 The fact remains
that both interpretations were plausible and would be valid according to
the text and history of the Constitution.151 When the Constitution
contains words that have a specific meaning (like “commerce”), which
have always had both narrow and broad definitions, the broader
definition should be used.152 Today, more than ever, we live in a global
economy with a national market that necessitates Congress legislate
“commerce” in the broader sense of the term.153
Even more important is the fact that both interpretations expressly
147. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
148. Id. at 189-90.
149. See infra notes 150-65 and accompanying text. While Professor Barnett’s position is
persuasive as to one original meaning, Professor Nelson and Pushaw’s position is more logical and
supported by early Supreme Court jurisprudence on the matter. See supra notes 143-48 and
accompanying text; notes infra 150-65 and accompanying text.
150. Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 6. “[E]ven if the
original understanding were restricted to interstate sales, the Court could not adopt it without
invalidating almost every law enacted under the Commerce Clause, which would wreak havoc on
America’s nationally integrated economy.” Id.
151. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
152. E-Mail from Robert Pushaw, James Wilson Professor of Law, Pepperdine University
School of Law, to author (Dec. 3, 2006) (on file with author). See also Nelson & Pushaw,
Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 8 (noting that the original meaning of
“commerce” must be applied “in light of the evolution of the federal system to meet modern
challenges”). Nelson and Pushaw contend that the Commerce Clause has the same legal meaning
today as in 1787, but that what has changed is society around it: “As America has moved from an
overwhelmingly agrarian economy rooted in self-sufficient households and local communities to an
integrated national market economy based on manufacturing and service, the scope of the Clause
has commensurately increased.” Id. at 8 n.34 (citing WALTER HAMILTON & DOUGLAS ADAIR, THE
POWER TO GOVERN 179, 191-92 (1937)).
153. Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 49. “[O]ur
economy has become so interdependent that almost all in-state commercial activities now affect
other states.” Id.
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exclude noncommercial activities.154 Article I provides that “[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in . . . Congress”155 and
therefore, this denied Congress authority not explicitly given to it in the
Constitution. Article I also authorizes Congress “to make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [the
government’s constitutional powers].”156 Chief Justice Marshall
explained:
Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which
are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress, under the pretext
of executing its power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects
not intrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of
this tribunal . . . to say, that such an act was not the law of the land.157

The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be invoked to expand
substantive commerce power.158 Therefore, under the Commerce Power,
Congress has no ability to regulate anything which does not come within
the scope of the term “commerce.”159 The original meaning of commerce
did include a broader interpretation and that interpretation, if not the
dominant meaning at the time our Constitution was written, has been the
dominant meaning since Gibbons; the meaning should remain in today’s
society out of sheer necessity to regulate our national market and out of
respect to Supreme Court jurisprudence.160 However, both the broad and
narrow interpretations of “commerce” exclude noncommercial activities
such as possession.161
Thus, the term “commerce” means the voluntary buying, selling, or
bartering of property or services and all the “accompanying marketoriented activities.”162 Commerce would therefore include the
154. See Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 104 n.26 (stating “I agree with Nelson
and Pushaw that even the broadest original meaning of the Commerce Clause that can be justified
historically is still far narrower than the power the Supreme Court currently allows Congress to
exercise). “Congress has no power to legislate conduct that does not constitute ‘commerce’. . . .”
Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 110. “[I]n the
noncommercial sphere, we object to federal standards because they wipe out all differences of
opinion on social, cultural, or moral issues—regional, state, and local.” Id. at 118.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
156. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 18.
157. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
158. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
159. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 150, 152-53 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
162. Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 8, at 909. The first requirement in the NeoFederalist approach to the Commerce Clause is analyzing whether Congress is regulating
“commerce.” Id. The first step in the proposed Neo-Gibbons analysis is the same as the Neo-
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production, manufacture, agriculture, transportation, and labor
associated with commodities or services intended for the market.163
Commerce would also include the byproducts of these market-oriented
activities such as pollution.164 However, commerce would not include
activities such as production, manufacture, and agriculture of
commodities that were not intended for the market but rather for
personal or household needs.165
D. “Among the Several States”
“Among the several States” could mean “between” the states or
concerning more than one state.166 Nelson and Pushaw argue that
“among the several States” has always been construed as “concerning
more than one state.”167 They note that the primary definition of
“among” both in 1787 and the present is “the mingling of” or
“associated with;” and that read naturally, “among the several States”
applies to “commercial activity that links one state to another.”168 Chief
Justice Marshall held that:
The word “among” means intermingled with. A thing which is among
others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot
Federalist approach for regulations but not for prohibitions, on this point the two analyses differ. See
infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
163. Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 8, at 884-85. Pushaw notes that commerce
cannot reasonably extend to personal or household needs such as a backyard garden or to issues of
purely a moral, social, or cultural concern such as violent crime.
164. Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 122-23. Because
the definition of “commerce” includes production and manufacturing of commodities intended for
the market place, Congress may regulate their byproducts as well, such as air, water, and ground
pollution. Id.
165. Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 8, at 885. See also supra notes 141-42,and 161.
166. Compare Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 42
(stating “among the several States has always meant “concerning more than one state”), with
Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 132 (stating that the text of the Constitution supports
the conclusion that “among the several States” means “between people of different states”).
167. Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 42 (citing United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 595 (1995) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95
(1824))). See also HAMILTON & ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN, supra note 144, at 141-42
(supporting this view). But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 587-96 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that
Congress can only regulate commerce only between the states); Barnett, Original Meaning, supra
note 124, at 132 (same); Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 695, 703-06 (1996) (same). However, because every act of commerce physically takes place in
one state, the relevant factor is not the location but the connection of the transaction to out-of-state
commerce. Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1403 (1987).
168. Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 43 (citing 1
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 286 (1961)).
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stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced
into the interior.
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce,
which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and
man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which
does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word “among” is, it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. The
phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to indicate
the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase
for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of
commerce, to which the power was to be extended, would not have
been made, had the intention been to extend the power to every
description. The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated;
and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the
sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State. The
genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those
internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those
which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect
other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the
purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government.
The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered
as reserved for the State itself.169

Nelson and Pushaw agree with Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis
and assert that “among the several States” did not extend to commerce
that occurred entirely within one state and that had no impact outside its
borders.170 If the drafters of the Constitution had intended to cover all
commerce they would have said, “Congress shall have the power to
regulate all commerce.”171
However, Barnett argues that the phrase “among the several States”
refers to “between people of different states.”172 He rejected “concerning
169. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824) (emphasis added).
170. Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 43.
171. Id. See also Ernest J. Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1448 n.21, 1450-51
(1954) (making this point about the term “among” in the Commerce Clause).
172. Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 132. Hamilton himself used the words
“between the States” when referring to the regulation of commerce. Id. (citing Federalist 23
(Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 153 (Penguin 1961)).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss3/5

30

Watts: Gonzales v. Raich: An "Economic" Mess
WATTS FINAL.DOC2

2007]

4/23/2007 9:26:13 AM

GONZALES V. RAICH: AN “ECONOMIC” MESS

575

more than one state” as too broad a construction of the original phrase
“among the several States” and blamed “Marshall’s vague formulation”
for improperly permitting “the expansion of the power to regulate
commerce beyond that which actually crosses state lines.”173 Barnett’s
argument for the meaning of “among the several States” must be
rejected for the same reasons his original meaning of “commerce” was
rejected above.174 Barnett’s meaning of “among the several States” will
not work in our modern national market and would require overturning
vast amounts of Supreme Court precedent.175 Barnett’s own words, “if
Congress can only regulate gainful activity that takes place between
people of different states, even the broader definition of commerce will
not encompass much more than trade or exchange,” express the unworkability of his view to modern Commerce Clause analysis.176
Nelson and Pushaw’s research and conclusion of the meaning of the
phrase “among the several States” is consistent with Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons.177 The meaning of “among the several
States” is “concerning more states than one.”178
E. The Meaning of “To Regulate”
“To regulate” unmistakably refers to the enactment of rules for the
purpose of controlling an activity, but does it include the power to
prohibit?179 Nelson and Pushaw maintain that “to regulate” does
encompass prohibitions, which are “inherent in the very notion of a
regulation.”180 Barnett suggests however, that the power to regulate
173. Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 137.
174. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
175. See Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 6 n.21
(stating “Congress has passed hundreds of statutes, many of which do not even purport to regulate
the exchange or transportation of goods”). See also Pushaw & Nelson, Critique, supra note 141, at
714-16 (noting that Professor Barnett’s theory would reverse Gibbons v. Ogden, invalidate the
National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, reinstate E.C. Knight, and repudiate
the decisions upholding the Civil Rights Act).
176. Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 136.
177. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text (setting forth this prong in the proposed
Neo-Gibbons test for Commerce Clause analysis).
179. Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 14 (citing 8
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 379 (1961)). Nelson and Pushaw, who find the meaning “clear,”
quickly dispose of this element of the Commerce Clause. Id. They maintain that “to regulate”
encompasses both rules that affirmatively direct conduct and rules that prohibit. Pushaw & Nelson,
Critique, supra note 141, at 697. The Neo-Gibbons analysis differs significantly from the NeoFederalist analysis on this point, as prohibitions are analyzed more rigorously under the proposed
standard then regulations. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
180. Pushaw & Nelson, Critique, supra note 141, at 714.
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generally does not include the power to prohibit.181 While not accepting
Professor Barnett’s theory that Congress had the power to prohibit
foreign commerce but not domestic commerce, he does bring to light an
important distinction.182 “To regulate” is not the same as “to prohibit,”
and depending on which type of statute is at issue (a regulation or a
prohibition), the choice used will affect the analysis and occasionally be
outcome-determinative under the Commerce Clause.183
The difference between a regulation and prohibition is apparent
under the “concerning more states than one” prong of the test.184 First,
without question Congress can prohibit certain commodities from the
interstate market.185 However, how far can such prohibitions can go?186
Can Congress ban a commodity not only from the interstate market, but
from the intrastate market as well?187 The intrastate market does not
have the requisite character of “concerning more states than one”
because by definition (and per the prohibition) there is no interstate
market.188 Therefore, the answer lies in whether the intrastate activity in
State X, in a commodity banned from the interstate market, competes
with other sufficiently similar commodities that are in the interstate
market, thereby giving State X an unfair advantage within its own
borders.189 If this is true, than the requisite “concerning more states than
one” part of the analysis is met.190
181. Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 139.
182. Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note, 124 at 139-46. Professor Barnett notes that in
other places in the Constitution, the term “to regulate” is used where it could not include the power
to prohibit, such as the power to regulate the value of money, not to prohibit the use of money. Id. at
140. He also notes that Article III, Section 2 gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction “with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress shall make.” Id. (noting the Constitution
distinguished exceptions from regulations).
183. “To regulate” is defined as “[t]o adjust by rule or method” and “[t]o direct.” Barnett,
Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 139 (citing Samuel Johnson, 2 A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (J.F. Rivington, et al 6th ed. 1785)). “To prohibit” is defined as “[t]o forbid; to
interdict by authority” and “[t]o debar; to hinder.” Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at
139 (citing Samuel Johnson, 2 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (J.F. Rivington, et al 6th
ed. 1785)). See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text (distinguishing the analysis for a
regulation and a prohibition).
184. See infra notes 188-91, 212-16 and accompanying text.
185. Pushaw & Nelson, Critique, supra note 141, at 714.
186. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text (emphasizing this point).
187. Id.
188. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text (analyzing Raich on this point).
189. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824) (setting forth the “concerning
more states than one” requirement).
190. But see Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 139-46 (distinguishing the power to
regulate from the power to prohibit and concluding that the Commerce Clause did not include the
power to prohibit in domestic commerce). See also Pushaw & Nelson, Critique, supra note 141, at
714 (making no distinction on the power to regulate and prohibit under the commerce clause).
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F. A New (Old) Commerce Clause Standard
1. Importing the Gibbons Two-Part Test from 1824 to 2006
The Supreme Court should adopt a Neo-Gibbons191 framework to
analyze future Commerce Clause cases.192 The Neo-Gibbons analysis is
based largely on the framework Chief Justice Marshall put forth in
Gibbons v. Ogden,193 and Nelson and Pushaw’s “Neo-Federalist”
analysis.194 As Justice Thomas stated in Lopez, the Court needs “a
standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause
without totally rejecting [the] more recent Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.”195 The text and history of the Constitution’s Commerce
Clause will support the results of the majority of the modern Court’s
cases.196 However, application of the Neo-Gibbons test will result in the
invalidation of some Supreme Court case law.197 But, some invalidation
is absolutely necessary to implement a “standard that reflects the text
and history of the Commerce Clause.”198 One would have to question
191. See infra notes 200-16 and accompanying text (setting forth the factors in the NeoGibbons test).
192. See infra notes 224-44 and accompanying text (analyzing application of the proposed
standard).
193. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See supra notes 36-37, 147-48, 169 and accompanying text
(regarding the pertinent parts of this case for the proposed analysis).
194. See Nelson, New Millennium, supra note 141; Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the
Commerce Clause, supra note 124; Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 8; Pushaw & Nelson,
Critique, supra note 141.
195. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas stated “one always can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity that, when taken
in isolation, would not have substantial effects on commerce.” Id. at 600. However, Justice
Thomas’s Commerce Clause theory suffers from the opposite problem; he has drawn the circle too
narrowly. See supra notes 144, 150 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 224-44 and accompanying text (applying the Neo-Gibbons analysis). It
should be noted, while supporting a great deal of outcomes, the Neo-Gibbons analysis does not
support the reasoning implemented by the Court in reaching these outcomes. In fact, the NeoGibbons analysis flatly rejects the three categories of Commerce Clause regulations set forth in
Lopez.
197. See infra notes 224-44 and accompanying text (applying the Neo-Gibbons analysis).
198. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting how far the Court had
departed from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause). See also Nelson & Pushaw,
Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 83 (arguing that the New Deal Court “twisted
McCulloch and Gibbons to justify its far broader holdings that (1) Congress can regulate activities
that are not ‘commerce’ as long as they ‘substantially affect’ the interstate economy, and (2) the
latter determination constitutes a political question”). Nowhere in Gibbons did the Court imply that
Congress could regulate noncommercial activities that substantially affected interstate commerce.
Id. at 83 n.384. Likewise, in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall “reaffirmed the Court’s power to
strike down federal statutes when Congress invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause as a ‘pretext’
to achieve a goal not enumerated in Article I or when it violated the Constitution’s ‘spirit.’” Id.
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any standard that left the present Commerce Clause jurisprudence at its
status quo.199
The Neo-Gibbons analysis applies Chief Justice Marshall’s two
distinct requirements for statutes under the Commerce Clause.200 First,
Congress must regulate “commerce.”201 Second, that regulation of
“commerce” must implicate commerce in more than one state.202
a. First Prong: Commerce
The first prong of the Neo-Gibbons analysis asks whether the
legislated conduct constitutes “commerce.” This Note rejects the view
that “commerce” cannot be defined into a workable standard to produce
practicable and reliable results.203 Research has shown that the term
“commerce” as used in the Commerce Clause means the voluntary
buying, selling, or bartering of property or services and all their
accompanying market-oriented activities, (which includes production,
manufacture, agriculture, transportation, and labor), that are associated
with commodities or services intended for the market, as well as the
byproducts of these market-oriented activities such as pollution.204
This definition of “commerce” is broad, but not as broad as
“economic” which can be extended to cover virtually all human
activity.205 One criticism of this approach is that it does not allow
(citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819)). See also supra note 157 and
accompanying text (setting forth Chief Justice Marshall’s language in McCulloch to this effect).
199. See supra notes 141-90 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of “commerce,”
“among the several States,” and “to regulate”).
200. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-97 (1824). Gibbons held Commerce
Clause regulations enacted by Congress had to meet two threshold requirements: it had to regulate
“commerce;” and it had to affect “commerce” in more than one state. See id.
201. Id. at 189-90.
202. Id. at 194-95. See also supra note 36-37, 146-47, 168 and accompanying text (setting
forth in greater detail the relevant text of Gibbons).
203. The majority in Lopez stated, “Depending on the level of generality, any activity can be
looked upon as commercial.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565. See id. at 569-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(arguing that efforts to define categories of activities that were and were not commerce was futile).
Some scholars have rejected the commercial/noncommercial distinction use in this analysis. See
Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 816-17
(1996); Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74
TEX. L. REV. 719, 768-69 (1996); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 74250 (1995). But see Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 124, at 111-32 (defining the term
“commerce”); Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 14-42
(same).
204. See supra notes 141-65 and accompanying text (arguing that this is the meaning of
“commerce”).
205. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 48 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating “the
Court’s definition of economic activity for purposes of Commerce Clause jurisprudence threatens to
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Congress to regulate noncommercial activities that have a substantial
impact on interstate commerce.206 However, the Constitution only grants
Congress the power to regulate “commerce.”207
If the first prong of the Neo-Gibbons analysis is not met, then the
statute in question is not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause and should be struck down without reaching the
second prong of the analysis.208
b. Second Prong: “Among the Several States”
If the statute meets the first prong of the Neo-Gibbons analysis,
then the Court must determine whether the “commerce” at issue affects
more states than one. Almost all commercial activity will have
commercial effects concerning more states than one due to the country’s
integrated national economy.209 Whether the commercial affect concerns
more states than one a sufficient amount to warrant federal legislation is
a question of policy, not constitutional authority.210 Courts should review
regulations of “commerce” under a “rational basis” test that asks
whether Congress had, or could have had, a rational basis to conclude
such a commercial impact existed.211
If the legislation is a prohibition on interstate “commerce,”
however, it will necessarily be valid in that it involves (1) “commerce”
and (2) at least two states.212 This does not necessarily mean that the

sweep all of productive human activity into federal regulatory reach”); id. at 69 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority in Raich “defines economic activity in the broadest possible
terms”). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 217-18 (4th ed. 1992)
(arguing crime is economic activity); Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra
note 124, at 109-10 (differentiating between “economic” and “commerce”).
206. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-55 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing for upholding the VAWA); id. at 655-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for upholding the GFSZ); id. at 603-15 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (same); id. at 615-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
207. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
208. If the statute does not concern “commerce,” then it is immaterial whether it concerns more
states than one for purposes of the Commerce Clause.
209. WALTER HAMILTON & DOUGLAS ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN 179, 191-92 (1937).
See also supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (examining this point).
210. Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 111.
211. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 20 (2005). The Court does not have to determine whether
the activities “substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’
exists for so concluding.” Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557). The Neo-Gibbons approach agrees
with the Supreme Court on the applicability of a rational basis analysis, it just disagrees about the
starting point (an actual regulation of “commerce”).
212. See supra notes 200-11 and accompanying text (stating the two requirements for the NeoGibbons analysis).
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Congress can also prohibit that same “commerce” intrastate.213 The
Court should review prohibitions that aim to eliminate intrastate
“commerce” in an article of “commerce” independently of the interstate
aspect of the prohibition to see whether there is a rational basis for
Congress to conclude that the intrastate activity concerns more states
than one.214 Obviously, the intrastate “commerce” of an article of
“commerce” banned from the interstate market cannot have an effect on
commerce outside the borders of the state in which it is contained by
operation of the interstate ban.215 However, it could have an effect on
other interstate “commerce” within the state in which the intrastate
“commerce” is contained within, if the intrastate “commerce” unfairly

213. See id. Whereas a prohibition on interstate commerce by definition requires more states
then one and therefore satisfies the second prong of the Neo-Gibbons analysis, an intrastate
prohibition by definition requires only one state and therefore more analysis must be done if the
second prong is to be satisfied. Id.
It should be noted, however, that there is nothing to prevent a prohibition simply from
being re-written as a regulation to avoid this extra scrutiny. While not all prohibitions can be written
as regulations, many can. For instance, in The Child Labor Case (Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)), the congressional act of
1916 that prohibited transportation in interstate commerce of goods produced in factories employing
children could have been written as a ban on child manufactured “commerce” or as a regulation
requiring certain labor standards for articles intended for the market.
In this example, as a regulation it would pass the Neo-Gibbons test because it concerns
commerce in more than one state. Written as a prohibition, the interstate prohibition aspect would
be valid per se. The intrastate prohibition aspect would require further analysis. Ultimately, the
intrastate prohibition in this example would also be valid under the Neo-Gibbons approach because
intrastate child produced items of widgets would unfairly compete intrastate with similar imported
out-of-state produced widgets that are held to higher labor standards as a prerequisite to being
shipped in interstate commerce.
214. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 44 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing Congress to
set the terms of the constitutional debate by “packaging regulation of local activity in broad
schemes, is tantamount to removing meaningful limits on the Commerce Clause”); id. at 72
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The intrastate conduct swept within a general regulatory scheme may or
may not have a substantial effect on the relevant interstate market.”). It should be noted that this is a
significant difference from Professor Nelson and Pushaw’s Neo-Federalist approach which only
considers the prohibition in its entirety. See Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause,
supra note 124, at 126 (concluding that under their test, “Congress could also directly prohibit
lotteries or, for that matter, all gambling in the United States. After all, not only is gambling
commerce, but Congress could easily conclude that it has a pervasive impact on commerce across
state lines.”). The Neo-Gibbons approach would not reach the same conclusion. See infra notes 229232 and accompanying text (analyzing a prohibition in the context of Raich under the Neo-Gibbons
approach).
215. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 55 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court generally
assumes that states enforce their laws). The same logic would apply to the federal government.
Therefore, the Court generally should assume that the federal government enforces it laws, and if
the government does not enforce its laws, it should not be rewarded with greater legislative
authority.
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competes with the interstate “commerce.”216
The Neo-Gibbons approach to analyzing the Commerce Clause will
provide clear rules that are easy to follow and remain true to the text of
the Constitution.217 The current three-category classification the
Supreme Court has used since Lopez is malleable and not based on the
Constitution.218 In fact, the statute at issue in Lopez was subsequently
amended to include a jurisdictional element requiring the gun to have
moved in interstate commerce, which moved the statute from the
“substantially affects” category to the “channels” category.219 Whether
an article has previously moved in interstate commerce cannot magically
turn mere possession of that article into “commerce.”220 To hold
otherwise, on the same theory Congress could regulate possession of
every object that has ever traveled interstate, and completely eradicate
any real limits on the Commerce Clause.221
The commerce power must have meaningful limits because
Congress has no authority to legislate conduct that is not “commerce.”222
The Neo-Gibbons rule provides these constitutionally demanded limits
on the commerce power.223
216. See infra notes 224-32 and accompanying text (analyzing the CSA in Raich).
217. See supra notes 141-216 (analyzing the meaning of the Commerce Clause and setting
forth the Neo-Gibbons analysis).
218. See Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 112. See also
Merrill, supra note 124, at 840 (stating that the Court has made no attempt to connect its three
category classification of acceptable Commerce Clause regulations set forth in Lopez to the
constitution or intent of the framers, because the scheme was just “a description of Supreme Court
decisional law”); supra notes 124, 140 and accompanying text (arguing that the substantial effect
test has no basis in the Constitution).
219. See United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135 (6th Cir. Mich. 1996) (noting that Lopez had
been superseded by statute).
220. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text (providing the definition of “commerce,”
which does not include simple possession). See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that simple possession was noneconomic activity); id. at 49
(O’Conner, J., dissenting) (arguing “Lopez makes clear that possession is not itself commercial
activity”).
221. See Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 8, at 910 (stating “simple possession of any
commodity is not ‘commerce’ and therefore always beyond Congress’s reach”).
222. See U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also supra notes 141-90 and accompanying text
(analyzing the meanings of the terms “commerce,” “among the several States,” and “to regulate”).
But see Jesse H. Choper, Did Last Term Reveal “A Revolutionary States’ Rights Movement Within
the Supreme Court?,” 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663 (1996) (arguing for complete deference to the
legislature); Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause,
74 TEX. L. REV. 719 (1996) (same).
223. See supra notes 200-16 and accompanying text (providing the framework and
requirements for Commerce Clause analysis under the Neo-Gibbons test). The Neo-Gibbons
approach also avoids the unnecessary hassle of determining whether an activity has been
traditionally a matter of local or federal concern. Either Congress has the power and can regulate it,
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G. Application of the Neo-Gibbons Standard to Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence
1. “Medical” Marijuana and Gonzales v. Raich
Under the proposed Neo-Gibbons standard, Congress has the power
to ban marijuana from the interstate market under the CSA.224 However,
the CSA bans all manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana
both interstate and intrastate.225 The first problem the CSA raises is that
the Neo-Gibbons definition of “commerce” does not include simple
possession or donative distribution.226 Therefore, the Court initially
would have to strike down the portion of the CSA addressing simple
possession, would have to exclude donative transfers from the meaning
of the term distribution, and would have to limit manufacturing to
manufacturing intended for market, and not for personal or household
needs.227 Applying this analysis to the facts of Gonzales v. Raich would
result in the CSA being held unconstitutional as applied to the donative
transfer to Raich from her donors, the growing of marijuana for personal
needs by Monson, and the simple possession of both Raich and Monson,
because none of these activities qualifies as “commerce.”228
Whether Congress can regulate the intrastate manufacture of
marijuana intended for market; the intrastate buying and selling of
marijuana; and the possession of marijuana with intent to sell intrastate
depends on whether this wholly intrastate “commerce” in marijuana
affects more states than just one.229 In the case of medical marijuana,
there appears to be no similar commodity available in interstate
or they do not. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 48-49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting the problem of
drawing a meaningful line between “what is national and what is local”). But cf. Martin H. Redish,
Doing it With Mirrors: New York v. United States and Constitutional Limitations on Federal
Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593, 596-603 (1994) (arguing that
the Court should determine whether an enumerated power exists to authorize congressional
legislation instead of trying to identify areas of protected state sovereignty).
224. The power to prohibit an item of “commerce” from the interstate market is per se valid.
See supra note 212 and accompanying text (emphasizing this point).
225. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing the CSA).
226. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of “commerce”).
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 200-16 and accompanying text (laying out the analysis of the NeoGibbons test). See also Pushaw, Counter-Revolution, supra note 8, at 910 (stating that the CSA
flunks the “commerce” test as applied to Raich and Monson who grew and possessed marijuana
solely for personal medical use, without the intent to sell it).
229. See supra notes 209-16 and accompanying text (stating the proposed second prong of the
Neo-Gibbons test). This part of the analysis is beyond the facts of the Raich case, but worth
analyzing as it could apply to future cases.
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“commerce” with which medical marijuana would unfairly compete
within the borders of a single state.230 Therefore, the regulation and
prosecution of solely intrastate “commerce” in medical marijuana would
be left to the state and local governments.231 However, if a sufficiently
similar product was found to exist in the interstate market, then Congress
could regulate the intrastate production of marijuana intended for the
intrastate market; the intrastate buying and selling of marijuana; and the
possession of marijuana with intent to sell intrastate, because otherwise
these activities would unfairly compete with the sufficiently similar
product in interstate commerce.232
2. Other Consequences of the Application of a Neo-Gibbons Test
Previously the Court has granted Congress near plenary authority
over all transportation under their “channels” and “instrumentalities”
theories.233 The Neo-Gibbons approach rejects this notion, and would
uphold only federal legislation governing transportation associated with
commodities or services intended for the market.234 Only this kind of
transportation would meet the definition of “commerce,” and Congress
could rationally conclude that even intrastate transportation associated
with commodities or services intended for the market would have an
effect among the states.235 The Neo-Gibbons test leaves federal
regulation of commercial transportation whole, but requires statutes that

230. However, Congress could regulate the intrastate manufacture, buying, selling, and
possession with intent to sell of marijuana if an interstate commodity is found with which medical
marijuana would unfairly compete within the borders of a single state. It is of significance that this
argument would apply equally to marijuana not intended for medicinal purposes. It is conceded that,
under the proposed Neo-Gibbons approach, Congress could protect the persons and things in
interstate commerce against crime, but this still would not save the CSA, as it does not protect
persons or things in interstate commerce from crime, but instead makes it a crime to have
marijuana.
231. See Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 138-39
(noting that this leaves the decision to the states whether to prosecute simple drug possession and
allows the federal government to focus on trafficking).
232. Even if this were the case, it would not change the analysis in Raich under the NeoGibbons approach because the case involved noncommercial activity. What would constitute a
“sufficiently similar product” is beyond the scope of this Note. Nelson and Pushaw would not
analyze this step under their analysis and would allow Congress to prohibit this type of activity
without the extra burden of showing an effect concerning more states than just one. See Nelson &
Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 136-39.
233. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (discussing Congress’s power in
these categories and citing cases).
234. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (listing this as part of “commerce”).
235. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also supra notes 36-37,
147-48, 169 and accompanying text (analyzing Gibbons).
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reach personal travel be invalidated.236
Regulation of commercial production and labor are valid under the
Neo-Gibbons definition of “commerce” which includes all production,
manufacture, agriculture, transportation, and labor associated with
commodities or services intended for the market. Regulations of
commercial production and labor will inevitably be upheld under the
rational basis standard employed in the second prong of this analysis.237
However, production not intended for the market but for personal or
household use is exempt.238 For these reasons, a Neo-Gibbons Court
would distinguish Wickard v. Filburn.239 Under the Commerce Clause,
Congress has no power to regulate agriculture not intended for the
market but for home consumption.240 A Neo-Gibbons Court would,
however, uphold the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as to
agriculture intended for the market.241
The Neo-Gibbons test would uphold federal criminal legislation to
protect “commerce” from interference, or if the underlying conduct was
commercial.242 If a federal criminal statute does not meet one of these
requirements, the Court should strike it down under the Neo-Gibbons
test.243 The Neo-Gibbons approach would also sustain federal
environmental, health, and safety regulations concerning marketoriented activities, so long as Congress rationally concluded they affect
more states than one.244
V. CONCLUSION
This Note advocates that the Court in Gonzales v. Raich decided the
case incorrectly by subjecting it to the Lopez/Morrison standard, a
236. See Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 120
(reaching the same conclusion).
237. The Neo-Gibbons analysis would uphold the result (but not the reasoning).
238. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (setting forth this standard).
239. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (analyzing Wickard).
240. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (setting forth this standard).
241. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (setting forth 7 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.). The
penalties assessed Filburn in the case could most likely be upheld as a condition of receiving the
subsidy on the alternative ground of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause.
242. See Nelson & Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause, supra note 124, at 126.
243. Id. Under this analysis, the Neo-Gibbons test would uphold the decisions reached in Lopez
and Morrison, as neither case involved commercial activity nor the protection of commerce. See
supra notes 52-65 (analyzing United States v. Lopez) and notes 66-82 (analyzing United States v.
Morrison).
244. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (“commerce” includes production,
manufacture, agriculture, transportation, and labor associated with commodities or services intended
for the market, as well as the byproducts of these market-oriented activities, such as pollution).
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standard not based on the Constitution.245 The Court has available to it a
justifiable alternative: the Neo-Gibbons standard, based on the text and
history of the Constitution, which will provide easy rules for judicial
review of legislation challenged under the Commerce Clause.246
Moreover, the Neo-Gibbons standard aligns with most preLopez/Morrison Supreme Court Commerce Clause precedent.247
The Commerce Clause is not a “Hey, you-can-do-whatever-youfeel-like Clause.”248 Judicial review of the Commerce Clause will only
be meaningful if and when the Court goes back to where it started in
Gibbons, interpreting the Constitution.
Gregory W. Watts

245. See supra notes 121-40 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 200-16, 218, 223 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 233-44 and accompanying text.
248. Kozinski, supra note 1, at 5 (referring to post-New Deal Commerce Clause as the “Hey,
you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause”).
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